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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the application of an agile risk management approach to perform asset-based risk
analysis to meet the information security requirements of SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises). This
approach is proposed as an alternative to traditional methods that are cumbersome, resource intensive and
costly, often hindering their value and use by SMEs. The organisation being studied is an Aged Care Facility
(ACF) with legal and ethical responsibilities. Within the business there is little knowledge regarding potential
information technology threats that could impact on these responsibilities. The ACF maintains a system
containing client personal and medical records, network communications, as well as financial and business
information assets. Understanding the susceptibility of this data to unauthorised access and/or exploitation has
become a key concern for the organisation. In order to analyse and communicate potential risks to current IT
assets and propose suggestions to mitigate and minimise risk factors, an agile IT security risk assessment
approach was developed in a collaborative research venture with ACF and their External IT Provider (EIP).
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INTRODUCTION
There are a wide variety of risk assessment methods and tools that currently exist in the world of IT security. A
majority of them are more adaptable for large companies with adequate financial and personnel resources to
accurately assess their IT security as opposed to SMEs with fewer resources. This section presents an overview
of the various methodologies, risk assessment frameworks and other tools that currently exist. Their potential
benefits for SMEs are discussed using the Aged Care Facility (ACF) as the case study, as well as any reasons
why they may not be suitable.
The problem was being able to determine and validate a suitable approach to perform the security risk
assessment for Aged Care organisations that could then be justified as an agile model for SMEs. As part of the
design process of this agile approach, workshops were conducted with an Aged Care organisation (refer to
section Identification of Threats to Critical Assets). Based on conversation, observation and feedback during
these workshops we determined that the suitable risk assessment approach for this ACF to undertake an
independent risk analysis of their IT assets, needed to include the following criteria:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Industry Sectors: To facilitate ACF representation and operation across a range of industry sectors, the
method needs to facilitate public, private and government organizations.
Language: The language of the method needs to be in English.
Cost: The associated cost of obtaining the method needs to be free.
Scope: The scope of the method must include usability by SMEs.
Management Use Required: The method needs to focus on the ability of ACF management to use,
understand and apply the method.
Required Training: Maximum (2-3 days) training or guidance is required to skill an ACF to apply and
use the method.
Consultancy Support: Consultancy support should not be required in order to apply the method.
Regulatory Compliance: The method needs to facilitate adaptability to changing regulatory
compliance.
Compliance to IT Standards: The risk assessment method needs to have been designed and developed
based on industry recognised and certified principles and processes to allow for future alignment and
compliance of ACF security with an IT standard.
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To both validate the relevance of this empirical criteria and understand the suitability of current approaches
available for SMEs, a review of risk assessment methods was undertaken. The review set out to determine
whether there is a current industry or government body framework available for comparing risk assessment
methods. It was discovered that the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), a
centre of expertise for Information Security in Europe, has generated an inventory of Risk Management / Risk
Assessment methods (ENISA, 2014). Currently, the inventory consists of 13 methods. To both describe and
enable comparison between the characteristics of the methods, ENISA devised 21 attributes and formulated
them into a template (ENISA, 2005). To assist SMEs with the selection of the most appropriate method, the
ENISA working group selected 11 of those attributes and tabled them with 8 of the 13 risk assessment and risk
management methods characterised by their features and functions which were judged to be best suited for
SMEs (ENISA, 2006). Six correlations from the 11 attributes that match and substantiate the empirical criteria
for the ACF case study were identified. Table 1 shows the relationship between the 8 methods and the empirical
criteria to demonstrate the comparison performed and determine a suitable security risk assessment approach for
ACFs. The criteria highlighted in green indicates the correlation with 6 of the 11 ENISA SME attributes.

Table 1 Suitability of risk assessment approach for ACF case study
The result of the review indicated that the Octave method and the ISO 27002 standard were the 2 most suitable
methods that match the defined suitability criteria. The challenge was then to combine elements from both these
methods to create and validate an agile risk management approach. The next sections provide further description
and justification for the selection of these methods.
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation)
The OCTAVE methodology was created by Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute.
OCTAVE is a popular, industry standard methodology that identifies a company’s critical IT assets,
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vulnerabilities and threats to those assets and develops a risk mitigation system to support the company’s
mission and priorities. Traditionally a self-directed approach, OCTAVE draws its strengths from members of
the organisation itself, utilising their knowledge of organisational operations and giving them responsibility for
applying the security strategy. OCTAVE is a very thorough method and allows a company to understand what
potential risks, threats and vulnerabilities there are to its critical assets. The OCTAVE method is also quite
flexible and can be tailored to meet the IT and business requirements of various types of companies. (Carnegie
Mellon University, 2014a). This methodology is best suited for use by large companies with sufficient
budgetary and people resources to undertake its development and implementation. It contains a lot of
unnecessary testing and information regarding elements of a large business that a SME such as ACF does not
have (Violino, 2011).
OCTAVE-s
OCTAVE-s is a variation of the OCTAVE approach to risk management specifically aimed at the requirements
and constraints facing smaller organisations of approximately 100 employees or less. OCTAVE-s analyses can
be led by small teams, typically 3-5 interdepartmental members with detailed knowledge of the inner workings
of the organisation. These personnel will collect and analyse key asset, systems and information and produce
protection strategies and risk mitigation plans based on the organisations’ unique security risks. OCTAVE-s
evaluations are performed more quickly and effectively when the team involved has a broad and detailed
understanding of current business and security policies and procedures. All required tasks may then be
completed internally and in a timely manner (Carnegie Mellon University, 2014b).
The OCTAVE-s methodology is a smaller and more concise version of the previously mentioned OCTAVE
methodology. This version of the methodology is more suited to SMEs as it allows a smaller working group and
takes into consideration the fact that smaller companies will have smaller and less hierarchies. This
methodology simplifies and removes some sections from the original OCTAVE methodology, providing a more
straightforward way to analyse a small business while still retaining the key assessment criteria of the original
methodology.
ISMS family of standards – ISO27k
The ISMS family of standards is intended to assist organizations of all types and sizes to implement and operate
an ISMS (Information Security Management System) to manage the security of their information assets, and
currently consists of 15 International standards under the general title of information technology – Security
techniques (ISO/IEC, 2014). A company certified to ISO27k means that it follows an established and verified
information security framework, and is compliant with the ISO/IEC 27001 Information security management
systems — Requirements standard as determined by an independent assessment of their ISMS applied to the
protection of information (ISO/IEC, 2014). Due to current resource including time and cost constraints, it is not
feasible for ACF to consider ISO27001 certification. This is consistent with the ENISA omission of ISO/IEC
27001 from their recommended methods best suited for SMEs. However Annex A of ISO/IEC 27001 includes
a set of control objectives and controls directly derived from and aligned with those listed in ISO/IEC 27002
Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls to be used
as implementation guidance when selecting and implementing controls for achieving information security
(ISO/IEC, 2014). As identified by the review and supported by ENISA, this guideline standard is suitable for
use by SMEs and therefore provides ACF with a method on which to build an ISMS if they seek to become
certified in the future.
Methodology choice and justification
Based on the results of the review, and in consultation with management of the ACF, it was discussed which
method would best benefit the assessment current IT assets. It was clear that the OCTAVE methodology would
be cumbersome requiring too many unnecessary tests regarding ACF IT systems. The OCTAVE-s methodology
provided the best-fit as it retains most of the threat assessment that the OCTAVE methodology contains but is
more tailored towards the smaller company being studied. The organisation has a staff population of less than
100 employees and a small but quickly growing information technology infrastructure. This is significant, as the
full OCTAVE analysis requires a detailed technical review of IT infrastructure. Small organisations often
outsource their IT services and therefore do not have the technical knowledge or analysis tools required to
evaluate their security effectively. A major benefit of the OCTAVE-s methodology is it can be tailored to a
small company who outsources their IT assistance (Carnegie Mellon University, 2014b), similar to the way the
ACF does for the management of their IT infrastructure. OCTAVE-s also suits the goal established by ACF to
focus review efforts on securing key information technology assets, as this is an asset-based risk profiling
technique.
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It was decided to use the OCTAVE-s method as the process to develop a report on the steps performed to
define, assess and provide feedback for this ACFs’ current security issues. As the only other method supported
by the review, the ISO 27002 control objectives and controls could be applied as a compliance checklist to help
build the threat based profiles and determine the severity of risks posed to ACFs’ IT assets. The checklist covers
11 key aspects of IT security, including asset management, physical security, access controls, and legal
compliance. The accompanying risk assessment matrix provided by the ISO27k forum (ISO27k, 2007) can be
used to score and rank each of the identified threats to determine which posed the greatest risk to ACF.

THE AGILE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH
This section describes the development of the agile risk management approach.
Establishing an impact evaluation criteria
Although traditionally qualitative in nature, presenting risk impact categories to an organisation using values of
high, medium, and low has some limitations. Within these categories, it becomes difficult to determine where
the more significant risks exist. Supposing there are multiple risks all deemed to be high impact in nature, where
should management first focus their attention? The aim became to integrate traditional OCTAVE layout and
analysis approaches with a more concise and definitive impact criteria to supplement OCTAVE findings and
provide more indication to ACF management of exactly which risks posed the greatest impact to business
objectives.
It is also important to note which areas of impact ACF management believed to be of greatest concern. It was
established that losses or compromises causing time loss or business reputation damage were to be the primary
focus. The criteria utilised to evaluate the impact of risks to ACF IT assets were adapted from resources
provided by the ISO27k forum detailed in table 2 (ISO27k forum, 2007, 2008, 2010).

Probability
Negligible
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High
Extreme

Explanation
Unlikely to occur
2 – 3 times every 5 years
Up to once per year
Up to twice per year
Up to once per month
More than once per month
Several times per week

Score
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Impact Level
Insignificant
Minor
Significant

Explanation
No impact
No extra effort required to repair
Tangible harm, extra effort
required to repair
Significant expenditure of
resources required
Damaging to reputation and
confidence
Extended outage and/or loss of
connectivity
Compromise of large amounts of
data or services
Permanent shutdown
Complete compromise of data or
services

Score
0
1
2

Likelihood of Detection
Very obvious or easy to detect
Relatively easy to detect, quite
noticeable
Can be detected, additional efforts

Score
1
2

Damaging

Serious

Grave

Risk Detection
Extremely High
High
Medium

3

4

5

3
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Low
Extremely Low

are required
Difficult to detect, quite likely to
remain hidden
Exceedingly difficult (almost
impossible) to detect. Almost
certain to remain hidden
Table 2 Risk impact criteria

4
5

A Risk Probability Number (RPN) is determined by the product of probability, impact and risk detection: RPN
equation: RPN = Probability x Impact x Risk Detection (ISO27k forum, 2012). The resulting value between 0
and 150 is used to determine the severity of the identified threat.
The significance of this equation is that converted risk levels may be reduced to zero if either impact or
probability of the risk is scored at zero. Regardless of other variables in this calculation, if the threat is unlikely
to ever occur or the impact to the business following this occurrence is negligible, there is no need for any
action by business management to mitigate the risk.
Ordering risks by these values enables management to quickly and easily prioritise their resources, ensuring that
risks with the greatest severity are addressed first. These values are subsequently converted into a qualitative
range in accordance with the OCTAVE approach, providing directed focus of security issues surrounding
critical assets. The qualitative conversion and result definitions present the agile risk management approach as
outlined in table 3.

0

RPN Value

Converted Risk Level
Negligible / No Risk

1 – 10

Very Low Risk

10 – 20

Low Risk

20 – 40

Medium Risk

40 – 60

High Risk

60 +

Very High Risk

Definitions
Negligible to no potential for impact on business
objectives and/or reputation.
No additional controls or procedural changes required
unless a significant cost benefit exists in line with business
objectives.
Limited potential for impact on business objectives and/or
reputation.
Additional controls or procedural changes only required if
a cost benefit exists in line with business objectives.
Potential for minor impact on business objectives and/or
reputation.
Management to identify if a cost benefit exists in
establishing improved controls or procedural changes.
Potential for unfavourable or negative impact on business
objectives and/or reputation.
Management consideration recommended establishing
viable risk controls or procedure changes in accordance
with business objectives.
Potential for unfavourable or noticeable negative impact
on business objectives and/or reputation.
Prompt consideration recommended to ensure risk is
managed in accordance with business objectives.
Potential for significant negative impact on business
objectives and/or reputation.
Immediate consideration is required to ensure risk is
managed in accordance with business objectives.

Table 3 Agile risk management approach

APPLICATION OF AGILE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH
This section describes the application of the agile risk management approach to the ACF case study.
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Selection of Critical Assets
Critical assets are those identified to be of highest important to ACF operations. The organisation will suffer
significant adverse impacts in the following situations:
 A critical asset or its data is disclosed to unauthorised individuals;
 A critical asset or its data is modified without appropriate authorisation;
 A critical asset or its data is significantly damaged, lost or destroyed;
 Access to a critical asset or its data is impeded;
In consultation with ACF management it was decided that the analysis would centre on the following critical
applications and systems:
 Application A – application controlling and storing key information surrounding the administration
of medications and care requirements for clients.
 Application B – application controlling and storing personal information for clients, including care
records, contact information and billing information.
 Application C – application used by management and payroll personnel to direct cash flow to and
from debtors and creditors of the organisation.
 Application D – application used by management and payroll personnel to manage staff rosters
and payments for work logged.
 Application E – application used by management and payroll personnel to create and dispatch
billing information to clients.
The majority of assets selected by management of this ACF were key business applications. Downtime, loss of
data or compromise of any of the applications listed or their data would hinder business function and therefore
prove a risk.
Identification of Threats to Critical Assets
Security evaluations utilising the OCTAVE-s framework are typically completed internally by personnel who
are intimately familiar with information technology security systems, infrastructure and policies. Identification
of threats to critical assets involved conducting 2 workshops with ACF and EIP management. The focus of the
first workshop was the identification of threats to critical assets following the OCTAVE-s approach. The second
workshop concentrated on the evaluation of the threat probabilities. These workshops were facilitated by the
researchers while the ACF staff responsible for the selected applications and systems were the decision makers.
In order to identify potential threats to the selected assets, each asset was cross-referenced with each control of
the ISO 27002 security compliance checklist. A threat was found to be applicable where ACF did not have a
control in place to protect the asset, and subsequently added to the worksheet of identified threats. Upon
examining the compliance checklist once for each of the critical assets, the potential threats were identified and
organised by asset for quantifiable evaluation. The next step in applying the agile risk management approach
was calculating the RPN values using the risk impact criteria calculation for each identified threat. Utilising the
equation RPN = Probability x Impact x Risk Detection, the researchers ranked the identified threats in order of
importance based on subjective understanding of the potential risk to each of the ACF assets. In this way they
could be presented to ACF management and EIP representatives for evaluation of their probability, impact and
risk of non-detection.
Evaluation of Threat Probabilities
During the second workshop, the probability scores were reviewed and amended based on input from ACF and
EIP management regarding their perspective on the severity of each threat to the IT assets. This collaboration
provided valuable insight for ACF by revealing and sharing the detailed knowledge of organisational policies,
procedures and infrastructure possessed by these individuals.
The existing security measures implemented by this ACF which affected the selected critical assets were
considered and evaluated when finalising the probability scores. The ACF had a variety of protection measures
including acceptable use policies, password policies and various types of protection for its IT systems. Some
applications had additional security measures in place while general security practices and protocols were in
place for all users of the ACF information technology infrastructure. This information was then used to
prioritise the identified risks for ACF. The second workshop concluded with the successful review of threat
probabilities with both ACF and EIP agreeing on what the most significant risks were to the IT assets. To
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complete the process of the OCTAVE-s methodology, a protection strategy and mitigation plan for each of these
risks could now be recommended.

PROTECTION STRATEGY AND MITIGATION PLANS
At this point in the analysis process, scenarios which posed significant risk to critical ACF assets due to the
potential for loss of integrity, availability or confidentiality of data had been established and ranked in order of
significance. Recommendations were proposed to ACF management and EIP personnel. Recommendations
were aimed at improving the security of each asset in one of three fields; probability of occurrence, impact on
the organisations functions and chance of non-detection. A reduction in any of these fields would reduce the
overall risk outcome and the chance of damage to the organisation through compromise of that asset.
An example of recommendations included in the report to ACF to improve security for a key critical asset based
on applying the agile approach is provided in table 4. A detailed risk analysis of all recommendations made in
relation to this asset and policy was provided to the ACF and EIP management.

Observations

Several issues have been identified regarding the way in which medical and patient
care applications are accessed:


Potential Threat

Recommendations

terminals are located in easily accessible areas and several are in public and
unobstructed locations;
 terminals are often unmonitored by staff or surveillance equipment;
 staff members are known to share and/or physically record access
passwords;
 complexity of passwords encourages recording of passwords by staff
members;
 terminals are often left logged on due to complexity of passwords and time
taken for login process to be completed;
 no timeout feature exists. Screen saver is displayed after 5 minutes of
inactivity, preventing sensitive information from being displayed, however
this will not prevent access to the information if someone attempts to access
the terminal. No automated logout feature currently exists.
With terminals often left vacant by staff in easily accessible locations, accessing
Application B without authorisation would be a relatively simple task. Obtaining
login credentials is also a possibility while staff members continue to freely record
and share login details. Access could compromise resident confidentiality and allow
unauthorised theft, alteration or deletion of key medical and personal information.
Short term – Revised computer use and password protection policies emphasising
immediate logout from Application B terminals and prohibiting password sharing
and physical recording. Introduction of automated logouts after periods of inactivity
will ensure no information can be obtained by unauthorised personnel in the event
that a staff member fails to log off. Re-education of staff to ensure proper password
procedures are known and adhered to. Mandatory password complexity and regular
password changes required of all authorised personnel.
Long term – Introduction of RFID or equivalent login cards for all medical personnel
to access Application B workstations. This removes the need for staff to remember
passwords and can introduce an immediate logoff procedure following the
completion of staff access, as logging in again becomes a simple task of swiping a
unique staff identification card. This alternative would improve application security
significantly more than policy change/amendment, though due to its cost,
establishment time and maintenance requirements, it is proposed as a long-term
possible solution.

Table 4 Application B – Unauthorised access and / or authentication – Risk Level: Very High

CONCLUSION
What has been developed and presented in this paper is not just an assessment of the ACF IT infrastructure and
security practices in relation to key critical assets, but a streamlined process, the results of which can be utilised
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by ACF to prioritise their IT security direction. The agile risk management approach can be applied to future IT
infrastructure developments within this ACF and other SMEs.
ACF management can reapply the matrix used during this analysis to track improvements in their security
infrastructure and gain an understanding of what improvements may be required in the future as their IT
infrastructure (and the organisation) continues to expand.
The combination of ISO27k threat assessment categories combined with the condensed assessment framework
of the OCTAVE-s risk assessment framework to analyse a specific asset creates a unique, versatile and reusable
methodology with quantifiable results for future assessments.
There are potentially some improvements to be made to further streamline the assessment process. The number
of ISO27k threat categories can be reduced for future assessments, as certain categories are not, and will not in
the future, be applicable to IT assets. This would reduce the time required to properly perform the analysis,
although care must be taken as threat categories may be overlooked.
The RPN value scale on which assets are ranked from very low to very high threat may also need to be refined.
Currently, any threat from 60-150 (theoretical maximum value) represents a very high risk of compromise to the
critical asset. With the addition of future data from other organisations or other critical assets, these RPN values
could be normalised to form a bell-shape curve, where only the top 5% of threats (for example) represent a very
high risk.
Ideally, framework templates may also be established for common asset categories, such as applications,
databases, and common infrastructure components. This refers back to ISO27k categories which would or
would not be appropriate to specific asset types. Having templates in place with these categories already
selected would enable the analysis process to proceed much faster for each asset, as the ISO27k compliance
checklist would not need to be analysed in its entirety each time an asset is to be evaluated.
The agile approach developed for the ACF utilised internationally recognised security methods and provides
them with a solid foundation upon which to base analyses for potential future security risks. By addressing the
threats we have outlined, the ACF will have moved closer to ISO certification if it were to become a future IT
development goal for the organisation, and considerably reduced much of the time, effort and uncertainty
associated with future assessments.
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